Saudi Military Spending: The Test Facing Khalid bin Salman

Saudi Arabia has committed resources on a scale that makes performance a legitimate public question. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated Saudi military expenditure at $80.3 billion in 2024, placing it seventh worldwide that year. This is an international estimate, separate from the kingdom’s own military-sector budget accounting. SIPRI’s 2024 expenditure factsheet (sipri.org) provides the comparison.

The Saudi Finance Ministry’s 2026 budget statement, page 89 (mof.gov.sa), distinguishes between the original allocation and the subsequent estimate:

2025 original military-sector budget: SAR272 billion.

2025 estimated military-sector expenditure: SAR239 billion.

2026 military-sector budget: SAR240 billion.

Those figures cannot be added together as three separate years of spending. Nor does the 2026 allocation show how much has been spent during the current war. The ministry’s military-sector description also covers institutions and services beyond weapons purchases, including military healthcare, education and the operation of facilities.

The scale of the commitment still demands an explanation of results. A purchase agreement records what a government intends to acquire. Readiness depends on whether equipment is available, crews can operate it under pressure, maintenance keeps pace and supplies last through repeated engagements. These demands can compete within the same budget.

An assessment of the minister should examine how those choices were made. If expensive acquisitions received priority while essential support was neglected, the failure would be managerial. If units performed effectively but demand exceeded reasonable planning assumptions, the remedy would be different. Public spending totals alone cannot settle that distinction; a performance review should.

The Greek battery has been in Saudi Arabia under a bilateral arrangement dating to 2021, Reuters reported. Its presence therefore predates the latest attacks. One successful engagement offers no credible basis for ranking Greek and Saudi crews against each other, especially without comparable information about their assignments and the threats they faced.

Foreign assistance can be a sensible part of national defence. It becomes a weakness when planners rely on capacity they have no dependable way to secure during a crisis. Saudi leaders need to explain which tasks their own forces are expected to perform and which depend on a partner’s continuing political consent.

The European responses illustrate the difference between forms of help. On September 24, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would send troops and defence systems to protect Yanbu, according to Reuters, carried by Defense News (defensenews.com). The announcement sets out an intended deployment; it is not confirmation that those forces have arrived.

Britain agreed on September 21 to a Saudi request for limited defensive aerial-refuelling support, with a Voyager aircraft expected in the following days. Reuters, via MarketScreener (marketscreener.com), described a specific supporting mission. Refuelling aircraft, operating air defences and committing troops involve different obligations. Treating them as one broad promise of protection obscures what Saudi planners can actually count on.

Regional partners have also moved. On September 26, Khalid met Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Turkey’s chief of general staff in Riyadh under the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, a three-way pact that treats an armed attack on one signatory as an attack on all, Daily Pakistan reported (en.dailypakistan.com.pk). The talks covered intelligence sharing and closer military coordination; no deployment was announced. A mutual-defence pledge carries political weight, but it becomes usable protection only when it produces forces or capabilities assigned to specific tasks.

The practical test is whether these arrangements provide enough dependable support for the tasks assigned to them. A minister should be able to account for that dependency without disclosing sensitive operational details.

The criticism of Saudi reliance on Washington has force when it asks whether political access has been mistaken for a dependable security commitment. Personal relationships cannot tell a military planner how quickly assistance will arrive or which missions a partner will accept. Those expectations need to be established between institutions and tested before an emergency.

A sweeping claim that the United States has abandoned Saudi defence, however, misses an important development. On September 17, the State Department approved a potential $24.3 billion sale involving 48 F-35 aircraft, engines and support, subject to further approval, Reuters reported via Investing.com (investing.com).

A proposed aircraft sale gives Riyadh a possible future capability. Delivery, training and operational integration would follow a different timetable from the threats being faced now. It also leaves Washington’s decisions about direct military participation separate from the transaction.

Saudi procurement and diplomacy therefore need to be judged together. New equipment should address an identified military requirement. Security arrangements should define the help available while that capability is being developed, and the limits that remain afterward. Announcing a purchase cannot close a gap in present readiness.

The same scrutiny should extend to Saudi support for partners inside Yemen. A force’s nominal size or the value of assistance it receives says little about whether its command holds together under pressure. An honest assessment would examine verified strength, training, supply and civilian conduct before treating a partner as a dependable part of Saudi strategy.

Support for a partner should come with an account of the military and political outcomes expected from it. Continued funding needs to reflect actual performance, including whether a force can fulfil its assigned role when fighting resumes. Otherwise, Saudi planning risks relying on capabilities that exist mainly in agreements and budgets.

The consequences reach far beyond Riyadh. At a UN briefing on September 22 (transcripts.un.org), UNHCR said more than 130,000 people had been displaced inside Yemen since the beginning of the month. Any assessment that counts only the protection of Saudi infrastructure leaves out the human cost of the conflict in which Saudi policy operates.

Improved homeland defence should give Riyadh more room to pursue a settlement. A policy that answers every vulnerability with wider fighting risks adding demands to the military while making civilian life inside Yemen more precarious. The effectiveness of Saudi strategy should include whether it reduces that exposure over time.

For the related economic stakes, see Silent Dossier’s analysis of Saudi oil exports, Houthi attacks and reported truce efforts (silentdossier.com).