Why Saudi Arabia Is Holding Its Fire on the Houthis, and When It Will Strike

Iran offered to reopen Hormuz at the end of a seven-day period. Its conditions, Tehran says, are nothing new: they were already written into the memorandum of understanding it signed with the United States in June, which collapsed within weeks. According to Iran International, they include lifting the US naval blockade, waiving oil sanctions, releasing frozen funds and ending hostilities on other fronts. President Masoud Pezeshkian has championed the plan, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says it carries the backing of the Supreme Leader, which would mean the Revolutionary Guard cannot quietly undermine it.

Trump’s reply was blunt: “I’m rejecting their deal.” Iran wants a deal, he said, and has to reopen the strait quickly because it is losing. The Wall Street Journal, as reported by Bloomberg, said he told aides he expects to resume bombing Iran after the November midterms. US officials also told the paper that he is wary of a new round partly to preserve dwindling munitions.

Iran was not asking for much, and Trump could have taken the offer. Turning it down tells us he intends to go back to war. If the war ended on today’s terms, Iran would walk away holding Hormuz and, through the Houthis, Bab el-Mandeb, having imposed its conditions on the United States. Trump will not leave the Middle East like that, and Israel is pressing him not to. He created this chaos, and he is responsible for finishing what he started.

Military writers across the region agree on the shape of any serious Saudi operation in Yemen. It would lean first on the Yemeni government forces, but it would also need Saudi troops and a large-scale campaign, and a coalition fighting the Houthis on that scale cannot move without the Americans. Washington’s message to Riyadh is effectively: hold on until mid-November, or January, once the new Congress is seated.

That is three months, October through December, in which Saudi Arabia has to absorb Houthi fire. Its task in that window is defence, gathering every partner it can. France has promised soldiers, radars and air-defence systems for the Red Sea oil hub of Yanbu, President Emmanuel Macron said. British refuelling tankers have been tracked in the region, and Italy is part of the effort. When Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on September 15, Cairo publicly promised “unwavering” support; a leaked account of the meeting goes further, with Egypt pledging naval forces and troops to protect vital Saudi facilities.

The alliance work is already visible. On September 25 the chiefs of staff of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye (Turkey) and Pakistan met in Riyadh under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the pact they signed on August 7 that treats an attack on one member as an attack on all. Turkey’s parliament speaker said the agreement has not yet gone before lawmakers and should be sent for ratification early next month. Commanders who are still coordinating are commanders who have time. The window is three months, and in January Saudi Arabia moves.

SHEBA, a self-described intelligence outlet widely followed on X, though not a highly reliable one, reports that Houthi leaders met the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and agreed on an expanded military operation against Saudi Arabia. The goal is not a ground assault. It is a sustained missile campaign against sensitive Saudi targets, from military facilities to bridges, with threats reported against a bridge in Riyadh itself.

That shift gives the game away. The Houthis understand that Saudi Arabia will respond and is preparing a military operation. Riyadh’s restraint is not the product of back-channel talks. The kingdom is getting ready, and the Houthis want to lock in their gains before it does.

Their logic is straightforward. If Saudi Arabia will not move before January, every week until then is a chance to raise the price, hit the hardest targets available and push Riyadh toward a negotiated deal. The timetable could also move forward: if Republicans lose the midterms in November, Trump may be forced to act before January, perhaps in late November or December, to shore up Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Either way, the Houthis do not believe they have much time.

What stands out is that Saudi Arabia has not bent. It has not normalised relations with Israel or even offered to. It has made none of the concessions the Houthis expected, and it has not eased the pressure by letting Yemen’s government forces pull back.

That was not the plan earlier in the year. Tactical Report, a Middle East intelligence newsletter, reported in April that once Washington and Tehran signed their memorandum, the crown prince intended to reach his own agreement with Iran and take Saudi Arabia out of the war. He had reason to feel he had managed the conflict well. The East-West pipeline kept Saudi oil moving to the Red Sea, the economy kept working, and of all the Gulf states the kingdom had been hit least by a war that Israel had pushed America into. According to Tactical Report, Saudi officials even met a Houthi delegation in Oman on the 14th of that month.

When this war began, the other Gulf states paid for it and Saudi Arabia paid least. The pattern has now reversed. Qatar went to talk to Iran. The UAE reached an arrangement with Tehran, and its trade ties with Iran are extensive. Oman has been neutral from the first day. Kuwait and Bahrain never struck back. Saudi Arabia is fighting this war alone and paying the largest bill in the region.

Talking to Tehran has not bought anyone safety. In Foreign Policy, former CIA analyst Shawn A. Howard argues that the Gulf states are trapped: they cannot pressure Washington into ending the war, they cannot find a substitute for American protection, and they cannot strike a deal with Iran that guarantees their security. Qatar has mediated from the start and has still been hit. The UAE has made more than one arrangement with Iran and has been struck repeatedly. Oman, the channel for talks with Iran and its partner on Hormuz, has been hit as well.

So Saudi Arabia is binding itself more tightly to the United States than it was when the war began. It has the F-35 deal. It has a civil nuclear agreement that opens a path to enrichment of up to 20 percent. And it has walked away from a Chinese-backed alternative to the SWIFT payments system. This is how Washington keeps the Gulf close: by offering programmes it once refused. Tactical Report says Qatar now wants a civil nuclear programme too, and if Riyadh has one, Doha will follow. Nuclear power means cheaper electricity, energy for data centres and generating capacity on a large scale, and the Gulf’s post-war plans are being built on it.

The Houthis are also preparing to defend themselves. Israeli satellite-imagery analyst Ben Tzion has published footage of Houthi tunnel complexes that US strikes hit hard during last year’s American campaign in Yemen. The Houthis are now digging them out again and widening their exits, a clear sign that they expect a large Saudi air campaign and want to survive it. Their offensive plan is to keep escalating. Their defensive plan is underground.

Behind both stands Iran. Tehran has been sending advisers, and the commanders who drove the offensive to Mocha were not Abdul Malik al-Houthi or his lieutenants but officers of the Revolutionary Guard, from brigadier generals upward. Iran’s support runs through smuggled advanced weapons and maritime supply networks for ballistic-missile and drone components. In effect, Iran is fighting Saudi Arabia through the Houthis, against the Yemeni forces Saudi Arabia backs.