Saudi Foreign Minister Rushes Back to Washington as Riyadh Prepares for War With the Houthis

The first reason is the Houthi escalation. Just before the trip, the Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted two ballistic missiles and two drones launched by the Houthis, with the drones aimed at Riyadh and the missiles at Khamis Mushait, home to the King Khalid Air Base whose F-15s fly the strikes over Yemen. Two days earlier the coalition reported shooting down six ballistic missiles. The Houthis declared a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia in July, and since a truce between the two sides broke down, attacks on the kingdom arrive every day or every other day. That alone gives Riyadh plenty to discuss with the Americans.

The second reason is the propaganda war that comes with it. On September 27 the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of striking a market in Taiz, saying seven people were killed and 40 wounded. The claim is baseless. Government forces backed by Riyadh said they hit a Houthi depot and vehicles, and Houthi sources themselves told AFP that nearly 30 of the group’s fighters died in the strikes. Saudi Arabia does not pick targets on its own either. Its strikes rest on intelligence coordination with the United States, Britain and France, which supply much of the information behind them. Washington has already agreed to provide intelligence and targeting data, with roughly 200 US personnel in the kingdom in a non-combat role.

Riyadh has learned what such accusations can do. Under pressure from Democrats who accused the kingdom of bombing civilians, the United States pulled back from the Yemen war, and that withdrawal was one of the reasons Saudi Arabia ended up signing a truce with the Houthis. The charge was always one-sided, as if the Houthis did not fire at civilian targets themselves, including toward Mecca and the approaches to Medina. Prince Faisal needs to be in Washington to head off any campaign by Democratic lawmakers, and to make sure Houthi claims are not heard at Security Council sessions or used to pressure the kingdom into stopping the war.

Then came a surprise from Tehran. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Iran does not believe Saudi Arabia and Yemen should fight because both are Muslim, and offered to help: “We are prepared to sit down and help Saudi Arabia and Yemen resolve this issue.” He spoke of “Yemen”, not the Houthis, and said Iran “empathises” with them. The presidency carries limited power in Iran’s system, where real authority lies with the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, but a president still weighs his words.

Iran is the Houthis’ main backer, which makes it an odd mediator. The offer does three things.

First, it tells Riyadh to skip Washington. Instead of going to the Americans, come to us, and we will sit with the Houthis and find out what they want. In plain terms: do not retaliate, and do not launch the major military campaign that intelligence reporting says Saudi Arabia is preparing.

Second, it is a message about the battlefield. The Houthis have pushed down Yemen’s Red Sea coast and taken control of the Bab el-Mandeb approaches. Offering mediation now is an implicit admission that they cannot advance much further. It also flatters the Houthis, who, unlike Iran’s other allies, insist on taking credit for their victories themselves. Tehran’s line, “what happens in Yemen is not related to us”, gives them exactly that.

Third, Pezeshkian has already said whose side he is on. Iran has said more than once that if it sits down with the Americans it will put Yemen on the table: an end to what it calls the Saudi blockade, open flights into Sanaa airport, and full freedom of trade for the Houthis. What Tehran calls mediation is Iran negotiating with Saudi Arabia directly, on the Houthis’ behalf.

According to Tactical Report, Saudi Arabia had in fact been studying a plan, after the Iran war and before the Yemen front reopened, to open talks with Tehran and settle the outstanding issues. Iran chose instead to unleash the Houthis on Riyadh and other Saudi cities, to take by force what it could have negotiated. Saudi Arabia will not go to Tehran now. It cannot negotiate with Iran until it has struck back, because any talks today would be held from a position of weakness.

What Rubio brings to the meeting matters as much as what Prince Faisal brings. On September 27, NBC News reported, citing three US officials, that eight US Marines, one officer and seven enlisted, were wounded on September 14 when an Iranian cruise missile struck the vessel they were working on in the Strait of Hormuz. The officials said the injuries were not serious but included smoke inhalation and possible traumatic brain injuries with concussion symptoms. The vessel was not a US Navy ship, and the officials did not say what it was.

This is a serious development on two counts. The United States never announced the attack; the injuries did not appear on the Pentagon’s public casualty database for days. And Iran has moved from hitting commercial shipping to hitting American service members.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who stayed in the United States after the General Assembly, wrote on Telegram that Tehran had seen President Donald Trump’s first reaction to its proposal but had received nothing yet through mediators, and that Trump had made both positive and contradictory statements. He said Iran’s conditions were clear, that any move to reopen the Strait of Hormuz depended on meeting them, and that Iran would not back down. Trump had already rejected Iran’s seven-day roadmap for reopening the strait, as we reported in Trump Rejects Iran’s Hormuz Offer. The missile that hit the Marines was Iran putting pressure on Washington while it waits for an answer.

Washington stayed silent so that it would not come under pressure to respond. Nobody was killed and nobody was badly hurt, so the incident was allowed to pass. When a single American soldier is hurt, the United States usually turns the world upside down; here eight were wounded and Washington said nothing. For Saudi Arabia, that silence is the answer before the question is asked. When Prince Faisal tells Rubio that the kingdom has a Houthi problem and needs to know when to move and how to coordinate, he is speaking to an administration that will not move militarily right now.

The second piece of news concerns what Iran may soon fire. The Financial Times reported, citing Western security officials and a person close to the Kremlin, that Tehran asked Moscow earlier this year for Russia’s advanced Geran drones. The Geran-5 is Russia’s upgrade of Iran’s own Shahed-136: instead of a propeller it has a jet engine, giving it a top speed of around 600 km per hour, slower than a cruise missile but far faster than a Shahed, along with improved sensors and guidance. Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth, reporting on the FT story, said there is no sign the drones have reached Iran.

Even if Russia delivered, Iran would more likely receive the older Geran-2 than the Geran-5. Russia and Ukraine exchange more than 500 drones in a single day, so everything Russian factories produce is fired at Ukraine, and a country like Iran would need thousands, not ten or a hundred. Moscow does not have that luxury today. The Israeli press has not ruled out delivery if the war resumes, however, because Iran cannot be allowed to lose it. Russia and China already provide intelligence and services that make the Revolutionary Guards’ missiles more effective.

If Iran does obtain the Geran-5, it would be a turning point in the war. Everything Iran launches today is the slow Shahed-136 or similar models; it has few jet drones, if any, in real numbers. Even so, these slow drones are causing heavy damage across the Gulf, in Israel and at American bases, and they still get past air defences. Ukraine, which has more experience than anyone, shoots down only around 60 to 65 percent of the jet-powered Gerans, against more than 90 percent of the propeller versions.

That arithmetic lands on the Gulf. The Gulf states are now investing in cheaper defences against the Shahed-136, including interceptor drones, because a Shahed costs 10,000 to 15,000 dollars while a Patriot interceptor costs 2 to 3 million. The war cannot be fought that way for long. If Iran’s drones become faster, the Gulf will lose the option of cheaper interceptors and will be forced back onto Patriots.

Hamad bin Jassim, Qatar’s former prime minister, has said that any Hormuz agreement will only work if it also covers Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq. He is right that no file should be left open. But the message underneath is that Iran has won, and that any settlement will be on Iran’s terms. When even former Gulf officials start to believe Iran can stand up to the United States, the danger is real.

The American weakness is on display elsewhere too. Early on September 27, British police arrested five men near RAF Fairford, the base in England from which US bombers fly in the Iran war, on suspicion of explosives offences and preparing a terrorist act. Counter-terrorism police are investigating an Iranian link, and the Revolutionary Guards warned in July that any base used against Iran is a legitimate target. As we set out in RAF Fairford Plot, this was an attempt to destroy American bombers from inside Britain. The war between the United States and Iran is no longer confined to the Gulf, and it is no longer fought only with missiles. It has reached Europe, and it now includes terrorism.