Skip to reading content
SSearch

Gulf

Egypt Guards Jeddah While Saudi Arabia Outlasts the Houthis

The Houthis threatened Jeddah port after Saudi jets hit Hodeidah on 20 November. Egyptian air defences guard it, and Riyadh can outlast the Houthis.

Red container cranes and stacked containers at Jeddah Islamic Port across open blue sea
Container cranes at Jeddah Islamic Port on the Red Sea, February 2020 (file photo). The Houthis named Jeddah and every other Saudi Red Sea port as targets after the coalition struck Hodeidah on 20 November 2026.Photo: Mateusz War. (cropped; crops shared under the same licence) · Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 3.0
In this article

Context

The Houthis have threatened to attack Jeddah port, and they mean Saudi Arabia’s whole Red Sea coast with it. On 20 November, hours after Saudi-led coalition jets carried out their heaviest raid on the Yemeni port of Hodeidah since the war began, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree declared Jeddah port and “all ports” on the Saudi Red Sea coast targets. He told workers to “evacuate them immediately” and told shipping companies to move their vessels out. As of 22 November no strike on Jeddah port has been confirmed. Images claiming to show one have circulated online, and none has been verified.

If the Houthis try, they will not be shooting at Saudi defences alone. Jeddah sits inside the sector that Egyptian air-defence crews and Rafale fighters have been guarding since the spring, alongside French, Turkish and Pakistani units. That is why the threat matters beyond Yemen. A Houthi missile that gets through to Jeddah would be a hit on a multinational air-defence shield, and a turning point in a war that Saudi Arabia is otherwise positioned to win.

Silent Dossier’s view is plain: Saudi Arabia can outlast the Houthis. Riyadh has given itself six months, it can absorb the damage, and it has handed the defence of its western flank to partners who do not run short of ammunition. The Houthis are firing at towers and ports precisely because they can no longer afford to waste missiles.

Key takeaways

  • After the 20 November raid on Hodeidah, the Houthis named Jeddah and every other Saudi Red Sea port as targets and emailed shipping firms to leave. No hit on Jeddah port had been confirmed by 22 November.
  • Jeddah, Taif and Yanbu are defended by Egyptian air-defence crews and eight Rafale fighters at Taif, working jointly with French, Turkish and Pakistani forces, while Saudi Arabia keeps its Patriot and THAAD batteries in the east for a possible return of the Iran war.
  • The Houthis are now aiming at high-value targets, such as Riyadh’s PIF Tower on 19 November, and firing single missiles at night to keep Saudi air defences on alert. Both point to a shrinking arsenal.
  • Saudi officials expect the Yemen campaign to run for up to six months. Riyadh can tolerate the cost of that timetable; the Houthis cannot.

What happened at Hodeidah, and why the Houthis named Jeddah

The coalition warned civilians to leave Hodeidah port before it struck on Friday, 20 November. Coalition spokesman Turki al-Malki said the raids hit port facilities used for “smuggling operations and the transport of weapons and ballistic missiles”, and that operations were continuing in Sanaa, Saada and Taiz. In Sanaa the coalition said it hit ballistic-missile and drone workshops and one of the Houthis’ main supply depots. Residents of the capital described the heaviest air strikes since the conflict resumed. Yemen’s internationally recognised government backed the raid, accusing the Houthis of using Hodeidah to receive smuggled Iranian weapons.

The Houthi answer came within hours. Saree said Jeddah and the other Red Sea ports would be targets, warned airlines that Saudi airspace was unsafe, with the exception of the skies over Mecca and Medina, and named a power station at Al-Shuqaiq in the south-west. The group’s humanitarian coordination office emailed shipping companies and others using Jeddah port and told them to evacuate.

What followed was a barrage aimed at Saudi air defences, and Jeddah was not hit. Saudi civil defence issued eight public emergency alerts in the 24 hours from 07:30 on 20 November. Early on 21 November the coalition said it had intercepted three ballistic missiles fired at Riyadh, the third day in a row that the capital went under alert, and two more over the Jizan region, with debris falling at Al-Shuqaiq. The Houthis claimed “accurate and direct” hits on the Al-Shuqaiq power station and Jizan port. Neither claim has been confirmed. Our report on the Houthi missile fire at Riyadh and the Eastern Province sets out what earlier salvos looked like.

Analysis

Who is defending Jeddah?

Egypt does, though not alone, and in a role Cairo has played down for months. Egyptian forces are stationed in Taif, in Jeddah and at a military base near Riyadh, where Egypt has also deployed Apache attack helicopters and Gazelle reconnaissance helicopters. Their sector is the west: Jeddah, Taif, the oil port of Yanbu and the western stretch of the East-West pipeline that carries Saudi crude from the Gulf to the Red Sea.

The core of the force is air defence. The first 86 Egyptian air-defence soldiers arrived on 17 March, less than three weeks after the US-Iran war began on 28 February. With two or three crew to a system, that is roughly 28 air-defence systems, Skyguard Amoun among them, moved into a partner’s territory within weeks. After the Saudi crown prince’s visit to Egypt the force grew fivefold, to about 510. Twelve Rafale fighters flew into King Fahd Air Base at Taif in September. Four have since gone home for maintenance and eight remain. Jets that need servicing after a few weeks on station are jets that have been flying: Egyptian pilots are in defensive combat, intercepting missiles and drones aimed at Saudi Arabia. Two C-130 Hercules and two C-295 transports shuttle weapons and equipment between the two countries, and Egypt has sent intelligence officers and electronic-warfare specialists as well. The full account of how the force grew is in our report on how many Egyptian troops are in Saudi Arabia.

Two rules govern the mission. First, Egypt does not act alone. Its units work jointly with French, Pakistani and Turkish forces, and no single contingent owns a single target. Second, Egypt refused a Saudi request to run independent patrols on the kingdom’s border with Yemen. That refusal is sound judgment: a patrol that kills one infiltrator drags Cairo into a ground war on someone else’s terms. Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has said publicly that Egyptian forces have been in the kingdom for months, in a defensive role, and will not cross into Yemen.

Analysis

Why Saudi Arabia handed the west to its partners

There is a reason Saudi Arabia arranged its defences this way. Riyadh keeps its most valuable assets, the Patriot and THAAD batteries and its own fighter squadrons, in the east, around Riyadh and the Abqaiq oil-processing hub, because it expects the war with Iran to return. It does not want to burn those interceptors on Houthi drones. The partners take the west. Britain has sent Typhoon fighters and Germany has sent air-defence systems, but the Red Sea coast is where Egypt carries the weight.

Egypt also brings something Saudi Arabia badly needs in a long war: ammunition that does not run out. Skyguard Amoun is assembled in Egypt, so Cairo is not waiting on a foreign production line to resupply it. Pakistan’s systems are Chinese-built and well stocked, and France and Türkiye (Turkey) make their own. The Houthis are trying to exhaust Saudi interceptors. They are shooting into a defence built to avoid that exact problem.

Analysis

Why the Houthis are aiming at towers and ports

Look at what the Houthis have hit this month. On 8 November a missile struck the Aramco Tower in Riyadh. On 19 November a missile blew out windows across seven or eight floors of the Public Investment Fund tower, the 80-storey headquarters of the sovereign wealth fund and the tallest building in the city. Saudi civil defence reported no injuries, and the King Abdullah Financial District was closed to visitors. The Houthis have since called the district a “military target”.

PIF Tower lit green at night between two white lattice-facade towers in Riyadh
The PIF Tower, headquarters of Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, lit green in Riyadh’s King Abdullah Financial District, September 2024 (file photo). A Houthi missile blew out windows across seven or eight of its floors on 19 November 2026.Photo: Faisal Arif (cropped; crops shared under the same licence) · Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0

These are prestige targets, and the choice is deliberate. Saudi strikes on Houthi depots and workshops have cut into the stockpile the group started the war with. With fewer missiles, every launch has to count, so the Houthis pick targets that make headlines: the financial district, a power station, a port.

The second tactic is borrowed from Iran. During its war with the Gulf states, Iran made a habit of firing a single missile at night at one country, then another, at Bahrain and at Kuwait. The missile did not need to hit anything. Its job was to keep air defences on alert around the clock and force them to spend interceptors. The Houthis are now doing the same to Saudi Arabia, one missile a night, every night. Three straight days of alerts over Riyadh are the pattern in action. The aim is attrition. It is the tactic of a side that cannot win a straight exchange.

Analysis

Saudi Arabia’s six-month clock

Saudi Arabia is escalating. Western officials briefed by the Saudis said on 17 November that Riyadh expects its campaign against the Houthis to last up to six months, and wants its Yemeni allies to gain ground before any talks. The kingdom has also replaced the commander of the coalition. The Hodeidah raid three days later was the first large move of that timetable.

That timetable favours Riyadh. Whatever the Houthis do to Saudi Arabia in that period, the kingdom has already decided to absorb it. Broken windows in a Riyadh tower do not change a state budget. The Houthis have no such margin. Their missiles are finite, their main port is under fire, and their supply line runs through the same Red Sea that the coalition now patrols.

The Houthis’ real goal is on the ground, and it is Aden. Since the truce collapsed in July and the group launched a broad offensive in September, Houthi forces have pushed close to the city, which serves as the government’s de facto capital, and they have sent fresh reinforcements toward it. More than 350,000 people have been displaced by the fighting. If Aden falls, the government goes into exile, and the Houthis become the de facto rulers of Yemen, holding the west of the country, where most of its people and most of its economy are. Talk from Houthi leaders about negotiating in Cairo is just that, talk. Nothing on the ground has changed to match it.

Analysis

Why is Hodeidah port so important?

Hodeidah is the Red Sea gateway to northern Yemen, and it has been in Houthi hands since the group swept south from Sanaa in 2014. Up to 80 percent of the imports that reach the north, including food aid, fuel and commercial goods, pass through it. That makes it both the Houthis’ economic lifeline and, in Saudi and Yemeni government eyes, their main channel for smuggled Iranian weapons and missile parts.

The port has been the prize of this war before. In 2018 government forces backed by the coalition fought their way to the edge of the city, and the battle stopped only with the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018, which created a UN mission to monitor a ceasefire in the city and its ports. That arrangement kept Hodeidah open for years. The 20 November raid shows that Riyadh no longer treats it as off-limits.

That is also why the Houthis answered with Jeddah. Hodeidah is their most valuable port, and Jeddah is Saudi Arabia’s: the kingdom’s busiest commercial port on the Red Sea and the sea gateway for pilgrims bound for Mecca. The threat is meant as a mirror. The difference is that Hodeidah lies open to the coalition’s jets, while Jeddah sits under a layered shield of Saudi, Egyptian, French, Turkish and Pakistani air defences. The UN has warned that the fighting could cut humanitarian supply routes into Yemen.

What to watch next

First, Jeddah itself. A confirmed Houthi hit on the port would be the biggest test yet of the joint defence of the west, and would put pressure on Egypt to move from a purely defensive role. So far, the defence has held.

Second, Egyptian reinforcements. Saudi Arabia has asked for a larger Egyptian presence, and Cairo has drawn up a plan to take the force from about 510 to 1,500 specialists, air-defence crews, electronic-warfare operators and planners rather than infantry. If Riyadh approves, they would arrive between 12 and 20 December. For scale, the United States sent 200 intelligence specialists to the kingdom and made headlines with it.

Third, the oil route that Egypt is protecting. Saudi crude flows west through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu, then by sea to the SUMED pipeline across Egypt and out through Sidi Kerir. Egypt is also refining extra Saudi crude, and its petroleum exports are rising. Guarding Yanbu is in Egypt’s own interest as much as Saudi Arabia’s.

The wider danger is a collision between Russia and NATO. Russian missiles and a drone fell in Poland on 20 November, during a European exercise, in what Prime Minister Donald Tusk called an intentional provocation; our report on the Russian missile in Poland covers that incident. If that confrontation turns into a war, the United States would have to pull forces out of the Middle East to support Europe, and the Iran file would become a disaster for the Gulf. That is the scenario in which Saudi Arabia’s western partners would matter most.

Until then, the balance in Yemen is clear. Saudi Arabia has time, money and a coalition guarding its coast. The Houthis have a shrinking missile stock and a threat against Jeddah that they have not yet carried out.

Share this article

Follow Silent Dossier

New articles and corrections are posted on our official accounts.

Silent Dossier on Google

Add Silent Dossier as a preferred source on Google (opens in a new tab)Follow us in Google Discover