Is Russia Helping Iran and the Houthis Against Saudi Arabia?

Lavrov arrived in Tehran on 19 October for talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the Moscow Times reported. In public he spoke of diplomacy and preventing a return to large-scale war. Behind closed doors, according to the Iranian defence analyst Babak Taghvaee, who cited sources in Iran’s air force, the Russian side put forward something far bigger: a squadron of Su-35 fighters to replace Iranian jets lost in the war with the United States, an S-400 system to protect Tehran, and Russian warships and submarines at Bandar Abbas, as summarised by The Defense News. Neither government has confirmed it. Taghvaee’s account describes Iranian officers as stunned by the scale of the offer.

The offer is logical. Western officials told Bloomberg this month that Iran has kept its missile and drone factories and that Russia is supplying it with missiles, the Times of Israel reported. Fighters and an S-400 would take Russia from quiet help in space to open military intervention.

Ukraine’s drones, guided by American intelligence, have hammered Russia’s refineries so badly that one of the world’s largest oil exporters has had to import fuel. Ukraine’s military intelligence even accused Egypt of supplying jet fuel to Russia, United24 reported.

Moscow answers in kind by handing the coordinates of American bases to the Revolutionary Guards. CNN reported in September that 14 Russian satellites, including the Cosmos 2573 spy satellite, passed over Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia before Iran’s precise strike on it, and US officials told the network Russia had fed Iran targeting intelligence. That help did not stop when the US-Iran fighting paused. It now flows to the Houthis: the Russians give the coordinates to the Revolutionary Guards, and Iranian advisers in Yemen, not Houthi fighters, use them. There is precedent. In 2024 the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia passed satellite data through Revolutionary Guard members embedded with the Houthis for attacks on Red Sea shipping.

The target is also Donald Trump. Every Houthi strike on Saudi oil pushes prices up, Riyadh then pushes Washington, and Washington feels it at the pump weeks before the midterm elections. Brent crude topped $109 after the Houthis claimed attacks on Saudi airports and Aramco facilities.

Look at what the United States has done in the past two weeks. Trump announced on 9 October that America would take diesel from Russia, and the Treasury issued a licence for Russian diesel imports, with about three million barrels heading to the US. American media explained it as a way to cut fuel prices before the midterms, but the deal is part of a larger bargain.

Starlink service used by Ukrainian units was throttled, and Reuters reported the order came from the White House. Trump demanded Kyiv stop striking Russian refineries. Zelensky refused unless Russia stops hitting Ukraine’s energy.

Then Steve Witkoff met Zelensky and European officials in Oslo on 20 October and flew to Russia. He met Putin in St Petersburg on 21 October for about three hours, with Jared Kushner expected to join by video link. CNN reported that Putin agreed to resume three-way talks with Kyiv and Washington around 10 November and raised a possible Russian role in mediating the Iran conflict. Our report on what Witkoff told Putin after meeting Zelensky sets out what each side said.

Moscow knew the Americans were coming. That is why the Su-35 and S-400 offer landed in Tehran two days earlier: it raises the price Putin can ask. Russia is unlikely to end the Ukraine war, but it may accept a halt in the strikes, which is all Washington wants for now. If it does, Russia turns from America’s enemy into a mediator, pressing Iran to stop the strikes and reach a nuclear deal. Lavrov already used his Tehran visit to push Iran to send its roughly 400 kilograms of 60 per cent enriched uranium to Russia. The war would then stop at the Houthis as well. That is why Washington wants Russia out of the picture by any means, even at Europe’s expense, at least until the midterms. Without Russian satellites, Iran cannot see what it is hitting. China provides satellites and weapons parts too, but the Russian help is decisive.

President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi asked parliament on 17 October to authorise forces to help defend Saudi Arabia, and the National Defence Council pledged “all necessary and possible forms of support”. MPs then delayed the vote to 26 October. Sending troops on a combat mission abroad needs a two-thirds majority. Tehran has warned Cairo against it in several ways, as we reported in why Iran is warning Egypt; Araghchi said an Egyptian intervention would complicate the conflict, The New Arab reported.

Parliament is waiting on two files. The first is the American talks with Russia. The second is Saudi Arabia’s effort to settle with the Houthis through Oman. If Russia agrees to step back and the Houthis stop firing, parliament will reject Sisi’s request. Cairo will present that as a show of parliamentary power and democracy. If both mediations fail and Iran says it will carry on, parliament will approve the request, Türkiye’s parliament will do the same for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the war will widen.

Even then, neither the Ukraine war nor the Gulf war would end; both would be postponed. A pause would still help Saudi Arabia, which needs time more than anything to reorganise and prepare for the bigger battle to come.

The Atlantic Council asked this month why Saudi Arabia, with more security partners than ever, is not safer. The answer is that its allies have not come down to the ground. Pakistan has about 8,000 troops in the kingdom and has ruled out Yemen; Türkiye sends air-defence gear and drones. No partner will join an offensive inside Yemen. Britain, which stayed out when America struck Iran, is now deploying RAF Typhoons to shoot down Houthi missiles and drones, but not to strike Yemen.

The Mecca Pact with Türkiye and Pakistan works like NATO: an attack on one is an attack on all, and members cannot leave for ten years. Saudi Arabia was attacked, and its partners looked away. These are paper alliances. NATO works the same way: if Argentina had mauled the Royal Navy at sea, NATO would not have stepped in, because the treaty covers attacks on members’ territory. Saudi Arabia’s allies want a defensive role only, and turning that into an offensive against the Houthis is a different story that, as they see it, will not happen.

If the mediations fail, Egypt, Türkiye and Pakistan will move, and others will follow. It becomes a Sunni axis against Iran, with a religious edge. Nobody can afford to watch the largest Gulf state hit like this. Saudi Arabia says Houthi missiles were fired toward Medina; the Houthis deny it. A few years ago a headline about an attack on the Prophet’s city would have drawn millions of readers. Today hardly anyone clicks. An attack on holy sites should bring states to their feet, and the silence is hard to explain.

That war would be fought in Iraq, Yemen and Iran, and it would have no visible end. Moving Egypt’s army abroad is serious. Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam is unresolved, Sudan’s war is burning, the Libyan border is not fully stable, a Libya–Türkiye agreement has angered Greece and Cyprus, and Israel wants to push Gazans into Sinai. Russia will only leave the scene when the Ukraine war stops.

If war is imposed, Egypt must fight it, and if Egypt wins, the gains would be beyond imagining. Economically, the Gulf states would know their years of support for Egypt’s economy were a sound bet on a partner who shows up in the hour of danger. Militarily, Egypt’s name alone changes the war, even from the second line. Strategically, Saudi Arabia could help Egypt with the Renaissance Dam: Egyptian aircraft flying from Saudi airfields would reach it far more easily than from Egypt. Diplomatically, Egypt’s influence would grow, and Gulf states would see Egyptian workers as an investment in their own security.